About a phenomenal intentionality
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.36592/opiniaofilosofica.v8i2.817Abstract
In this essay we offer two reasons to believe in a relatively new research program in philosophy of mind: The Theory of Phenomenal Intentionality. We approach how this theory was made, by clarifying its most important aspect and for this, we show why phenomenal intentionality is based on the phenomenal properties of the conscious experience of subjects to form the mental contents which are here regarded as intrinsic properties of conscious experience. Finally, we will present two arguments that defend 1) the existence of internalist phenomenal intentional states and 2) phenomenal intentionality as the primary (intrinsic / genuine) source of intentionality itself.
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