Recent Works on Absent Intuitional Experience Challenge

Abstract

Some philosophers claim that intuitions are non-sensory experiences (BENGSON, 2015; CHUDNOFF, 2011, 2013; KOKSVIK, 2020). There is something like feeling an intuition and it’s particular and unique to this mental state. However, some question this experience from the first person perspective: they claim to have none of this kind of experience. How to solve this? John Bengson, Elijah Chudnoff, and Ole Koksvik claim that these people who affirm to not have an intuicional experience are searching it in the wrong way in their flux of consciousness. Bengson says that we shouldn’t just trust our introspection, but see what “strike us” when we are presented to certain situations. Chudnoff says that intuitions are experiences constituted by another experiences, then we shouldn’t expect to have intuitions without any other experience. Koksvik says that intuições possess an attitude-specific phenomenology, but not content-specific phenomenology. That is, there is no phenomenological distinction between intuiting that p and intuiting that q. The aim here is not to give a definitive answer to this question, but to do a critic survey of the answers given in the literature about this challenge.